Iraqi National Library and Archive

Records and Archives Recovery in Iraq: Past, Present and Future

(Saad Eskander, DG, Iraq National Library & Archive)

The paper will discuss the state of Iraq's National Library and Archive (INLA) under the former regime, focusing on its steps to safeguard its collections before the outbreak of the Third Gulf War (March-April 2003). It will demonstrate that had the INLA's former administration fully prepared itself for the war, its archival losses could have been avoided or, at least, considerably minimized. That is why it is important to draw some lessons from the INLA's bitter experience.

The paper will explain the new plans of the INLA for the retrieval of its missing documents and records, the reconstruction of its micrographic laboratory, the restoration of its water-damaged documents and records and the reconstruction of its archival collections. Some light will be shed on the INLA's endeavors to meet enormous challenges under very difficult political and financial conditions.

Background

Under Saddam's regime (1979-2003), Iraq was involved in three destructive wars (1980-1988, 1991 and 2003). Its cities and towns were the scene of popular uprisings, armed confrontations and chaos. Yet, the three main central ministries (i.e. Education, Higher Education and Culture) never seriously considered how to protect Iraq's cultural heritage, including archives, libraries and museums.

At present, there is a pressing need to annihilate the totalitarian values of the former regime, which were openly hostile to individual initiatives, critical thinking and creativity. The absence of any rational planning for the safeguarding of Iraq's cultural heritage must be placed within the context of the hegemony of these obsolete values, as the INLA's experience clearly shows. Its archivists and librarians never considered, or more accurately were not allowed to consider, the likelihood of the occurrence of disasters. Therefore, it is not surprising to learn that no disaster recovery planning was undertaken prior to the outbreak of the third Gulf war. Moreover, instead of protecting Iraq's cultural heritage, several high-rank government officials were directly involved in smuggling ancient artefacts, rare books and manuscripts. This means that the destruction of Iraq's cultural heritage began during Saddam's era.

The INLA's Former Administration

It is well known that a national archives' ability to deal with any disaster depends to a large extent on, first having archivists trained in disaster recovery and, second possessing an effective disaster plan. Under Saddam's rule, the INLA had neither trained conservators and restorers nor a disaster recovery plan. Moreover, the archival and library collections in the INLA's repositories were in very bad shape, as the regime removed the air-conditioning system. Dust and high temperature took their toll on the collections. All this effectively means that the mismanagement of the INLA and the unpreparedness of its staff put the entire collections of documents, records, books, periodicals, maps and photographs at risk of total loss.

a) The Old Reproduction Policy

The INLA have had a reproduction policy since the late 1980's. Thousands of historical documents and some old periodicals were copied onto microfilms and microfiches. Having said that, the reproduction process was not carried out in a correct environment and neither were the films placed in appropriate storage. Moreover, the INLA had no preventive conservation and preservation policy to protect its collections. There was no chemical (wet) laboratory to repair damaged paper-made items. Even the binding unit was shutdown eleven years ago, because of neglect and indifference. Wet and dry laboratories are essential for the success of any preservation and conservation policy that is going to enable the minimisation cultural losses.

The rational for having a reproduction policy was simply that readers had to use copies of the original archival collections (i.e. microfiches and microfilms). The issue of safeguarding the original collections against mistreatment and loss was the main concern of the INLA's archivists. Strangely enough, only one copy of the microfilms and microfiches was made. This is a clear evidence of the shortsightedness of the INLA's former director-general and their assistants. They were in a position to make a second or even a third copy for disaster recovery purposes. These copies could have been put in some secure places, outside the INLA's main building. In other words, had the former administration of the INLA taken their responsibilities very seriously, the cultural losses of mid-April 2003 would have been much less then they were.

b) The Old Emergency Plan

Every year, the Ministry of Culture instructed the INLA's senior staff to put together a basic emergency plan, with the aim of protecting the collections and the equipment under war conditions. On the eve of the outbreak of the last war, all ministries received orders from the leaders of the former regime to look for alternative sites so that they could continue to function if the fighting started. Instructed by the Minister of Culture, the former director general of the INLA formed a special committee, consisting of the heads of several departments. The committee's principal objective was to form so called self-defence teams. Indeed, seven of these teams were formed. They contained four to five members, and had to play different roles: the first team was responsible for order and security, the second team for rescue, the third team for fire fighting, the fourth team for first aid, the fifth team for blackout, the sixth team for logistics and the seventh team for shelter.

The Ministry of Culture provided the INLA with some guns and fuel. The Minister himself instructed all state-run cultural institutions to practise their emergency plan on a weekly basis. As far as the INLA was concerned, only the rescue and fire-fighting teams took part in such activities, while some employees stayed one night or two to patrol the main building. Later on, the former director general set up an operation room without clearly specifying its tasks or objectives.

The emergency plan had several defects, as it was put together in a very short period of time, without engaging in serious consultation and deliberation with the INLA's senior staff. The tasks of the emergency teams were not well defined, and some of the employees were members of two or three teams simultaneously! The budget for the implementation of the emergency plan, which did not exceed US$250, was extremely limited. The former director general purchased some basic items, such as water-containers and first-aid materials. One should hold the prevailing totalitarian culture responsible for the carelessness and the unpreparedness that characterised the behaviour and actions of the INLA's senior staff during the application of the emergency plan. Probably the weakest part of the emergency plan was that it only took into consideration external threats, notably aerial-bombing, whilst ignoring internal threats, including sabotage.

c) The Relocation of Collections

The idea of relocating a large portion of the INLA's collections (e.g. historical documents and rare books) came from above, i.e. the Minister of Culture. Microfilms and microfiches were also relocated. The proximity of the INLA to the Ministry of Defence was given as the main reason for the relocation of the collections. The latter was clearly a military target, if war broke out. Finding a site for the collections proved to be very problematic. The former director general of Saddam's Centre for Manuscripts (now the National Centre for Manuscripts) refused to cooperate with the INLA, before rejecting a proposal to put its collections in a secret shelter, where he had already hidden his manuscripts. His attitude can be explained by the fact that, in the past, the activities of all state-run cultural institutions suffered from lack of any meaningful collaboration and coordination. Horizontal relations and constructive interactions were discouraged, while hierarchical and outdated self-sufficiency values and practices were endorsed and publicised. This was the state of affairs when the Ministry of Culture made at the end a unilateral decision to transfer the INLA's collections to the basement of the State Board of Tourism. The latter was well known to be the stronghold of Saddam's secret agents, the infamous Mukhabarat. Around seventeen librarians and archivists participated in the relocation operation of the collections.

The transferred collections included the followings:

· The invaluable collection of Ottoman legal records (more than one thousand volumes)

· Thousands of historical files relating to the British Occupation

· Thousands of historical files relating to the Monarchical era

· Hundreds of personal records of Iraqi politicians and statesmen of the Monarchical and Republican eras

· The records of the Iraqi Parliament for the Monarchical and Republican era

· The minutes of Cabinets meetings

· A large quantity of microfiches and microfilms

· The proceedings of all Courts set up by the Ba'athists to try their opponents

· The proceedings of Provincial Martial Councils

· Files of the State Security for the period 1961-1963.

· All rare and unique Books

d) The Selection of the Wrong Site

The former director general of the INLA lacked assertive and imaginative leadership qualities. He completely neglected his legal and moral responsibilities towards his subordinates and was absolutely indifferent to the collections. He neither participated in any serious discussion of the fate of collections, (e.g. finding a secret site for the collections), nor supervised the relocation operation.

The decision to put the collections inside the basement of the State Board of Tourism was a big mistake for the following reasons:

· The new site for the collections was not secret, as the employees of the State Board of Tourism were aware of both their high value and their existence at the basement of their building

· There were water-pipes inside the basement

· The basement was damp and dark place unsuitable for storing paper-made items

· The basement had no fire extinguishers

· The basement was not guarded by the INLA's own employees or by any security guards

· The collections were piled up, without being placed in suitable containers for protection

The ideal location for the collections was the Mosques, which surrounded the INLA's main building from different directions:

· In terms of security, the Mosques were (and are) generally the safest places in the country. Neither the foreigners nor the locals would violate their sanctity.

· The custodians of places worship are well known for their open-mindedness and willingness to help in time of crises.

· The INLA' main building was (and is) in close proximity to several Mosques. Therefore, it would have been simple and inexpensive to carryout the relocation operation of the collections

· It would have been very easy for the INLA's staff to conduct the relocation operation, and to keep an eye open on their condition.

The Fires of 10^th -12^th April, 2003

In March 2003, as the Third Gulf War began, a group of Iraqi Republican Guards took their position in the INLA's garden. The Republican Guards' action turned the INLA into a military target. This development complicated the security situation even further, as it paralysed the activities of the INLA's staff.

a) A Man-Made Disaster

Immediately after the downfall of Saddam's regime, some arsonists set fire to various parts of the INLA's building, causing considerable structural damage. Almost all the equipments was destroyed or carried away. Most importantly, serious damage was inflicted upon the archival collections. The reason why the arsonists were so easily able to burn and loot the INLA was that American soldiers withdrew from the site, leaving it without any protection whatsoever. Within the space of three days, the INLA lost a large portion of its archival collections, especially the Republican archive (1958-1979), which was destroyed in its entirety.

There were other significant cultural losses. A few weeks after the destruction of the INLA's building, some looters ransacked a portion of the relocated collections in the basement of the State Board of Tourism and then flooded the place by breaking the water pipes. This criminal act could have been prevented, had the INLA's senior archivists informed the representatives of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) about the whereabouts of the relocated collections. Thus, the INLA lost another portion of its collection as a direct result of the bad-judgement of its senior archivists, who were extremely distrustful of foreigners. In sum, the INLA lost around 60% of its archival collections, and 25% of its library collections, including rare books, maps and photos. The remaining collections were in very bad condition, as they were exposed to high temperature and covered by thick soot and dust.

If one studies the type of the missing historical documents and the rare books, one can see that the looters were relatively educated people. They knew what to take and where to find it. There is little doubt that Iraq's neighbours got hold of the INLA's library and archival collections by various means, including smuggling. A large percentage of the missing archival collections were concerned with some sensitive issues, such Iraq's border problems and relations with Iran, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

b) The Water-Damaged Documents

As far as the water-damaged documents and records are concerned, the Library of Congress advised the INLA to place them in large freezers, until some of its archivists obtain the necessary knowledge to restore them. This proved very difficult to achieve, as the INLA's annual budget was (and is) very limited and Baghdad suffered and still suffers from acute shortage of electricity supplies.

Under the direct supervision of the CPA's Cultural Office in the Green Zone, a group of American military men undertook to transfer all the water-damaged files and records to a temporary location. The new location was a private flat, whose rent was paid by the Cultural Office. The flat had no ventilation system and was very small and damp. As the flat was not big enough, thousands of the files and records were pilled up outside it. Unfortunately, the rain and humidity inflicted considerable damage to them.

In December 2003, the remaining files and records were transferred to the freezers of the High Officers Club, the designated new site of the INLA at the time. While the INLA's archivists were hoping that they would be given assistance to restore as much of the water-damaged files and records as possible, Mr. Paul Breimer, the head of the CPA, unexpectedly decided to take possession of the High Officers Club, before turning it into a new site for the newly formed High Judiciary Council. Breimer's arbitrary decision had dire consequences for the water-damaged documents and records. A few months later, an American military unit tried to assist the INLA by funding a project to transfer the water-damaged documents and records from the High Officers Club to the old site in order to place them into a big freezer. The project eventually failed due to mismanagement and lack of consultation.

c) The Second Relocation Operation

Immediately after the destruction of the INLA, a group of young men led by a Shi'i clergyman decided to relocate the remaining archival collections, as the easiest way to protect them. The INLA's archivists were not consulted about the second relocation operation. Rashness and carelessness characterized the whole relocation operation. The INLA's archivists could not supervise the relocation operation. No listing was made of the relocated documents and records. Sacks were used to carry the remaining collections, before being stored in a Mosque in the Al-Thawra City. The archivists should have regularly visited the Mosque to monitor the state of the relocated items.

The second relocation operation inflicted further damage on the INLA's archival collections, because of mishandling, bad storage conditions and thefts. In short, the second relocation operation was, like the first one, a unnecessary step and a huge mistake. The remaining archival collections should have been left where they were, in the manner of the library collections that were protected by a group of guards. It is worth noting that to protect the remaining collections at the time, the CPA's senior cultural advisers hired more guards, who were provided with some guns and ammunition.

New Administration & New Plans

The national archive and national library are crucial institutions as far as the on-going construction process of a democratic Iraq is concerned. By making accessible the cultural and historical legacy of the country, they help shape a true national identity and forge a common historical memory. It is, therefore, imperative to maintain these institutions by redefining their roles, improving their structure and services, and preserving their collections by providing environmental control, protection against fire and appropriate storage condition.

After the end of the war, the INLA encountered huge challenges. It was the most damaged cultural institution in the country. Its building sustained considerable structural damage. Almost all equipment was destroyed or carried away. The archivists and librarians had to work on several fronts simultaneously with very limited budget. For instance, the 2004 budget was not more than US$70,000. This budget was not enough to meet the INLA's basic needs, such as furniture. Moreover, the INLA was isolated from the international community of national libraries and archives. This can explain why it was unable to benefit from foreign expertise and research in such fields as preservation, conservation and disaster recovery.

To move forward, the INLA has had to:

(1) develop its human resources by training some of our archivists as restorers

(2) activate its relations with key international organisations, especially ICA and IFLA) and foreign national archives and national libraries to acquire the much needed expertise and knowledge

(3) acquire necessary equipment

(4) modernise its structure and redefine its functions

(5) find new site or, at least, add new annexes to its present site

(6) put together a disaster recovery plan

(7) work on introducing new legislation for archives.

A) The Reconstruction of the Archival Collections

The INLA's efforts have been focused, as mentioned before, on how to find the missing documents, records and rare books. The INLA has endeavoured to identify the whereabouts of the missing items. Have they remained in Iraq? Have they been smuggled abroad? What measures should the INLA take to recover the missing items? Should the INLA press for a radical change in archival legislation? Should the INLA provide financial incentive to retrieve its missing documents and rare books?

So far, the INLA has been unable to make any real progress on these fronts, because of the unfavourable political and security factors, which had, and still have, direct effects on the INLA's role and activities. The INLA has reached a conclusion that it could not make any meaningful progress, without acquiring the full support of the three branches of government: the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary. The INLA is hopeful that the new general elections (15 December 2005) will create favourable conditions for reaching its goals and achieving its tasks.

At the same time as endeavouring to recover the missing documents and other materials, the INLA has been seeking to strengthen its archival collections. The INLA has established contacts with some important foreign national libraries and national archives. One of the INLA's principal aims has been to copy on microfilm and microfiche documents or rare books relating to Iraq's modern history.

In this respect, the INLA has made some progress, as it received from the British Library microfilms and microfiches of its archival collections at its Oriental and India Office. They cover an imperative period of Iraq's modern history, i.e. the British occupation, 1914-1921. The British government funded the project, known now as "the Creation of Modern Iraq". The INLA has a similar agreement with the UK National Archives (TNA). The TNA has funded around 49% of the reproduction of its documents and records relating to another period of Iraq's modern history, i.e. the British mandate, 1921-1932. The INLA hopes that in the near future it can reach similar agreement with the national archives of the neighboring countries, particularly Turkey and Iran, with which Iraq has old historical relations. The INLA's archivists are not naïve to believe that the copies of foreign archival collections can act as a compensation for the lost or the missing documents and records. The cultural losses of the INLA are irreplaceable by reason of their uniqueness.

d) The Issue of the Archives of the Former Regime & Iraq Memory Foundation

No one in Iraq has been willing to talk about the fate of the archives of the former regime's repressive organisations. These archives contained very sensitive documents and records that affect, and will affect, the lives of hundreds of thousands of people. From an academic point of view, the seized documents and records are invaluable sources of information that can deepen scholars' understanding of the nature of the former regime.

Immediately after the collapse of Saddam's rule and in the middle of the ensuing chaotic situation, several political parties, newly formed NGOs and even ordinary civilians hurried to control tens of millions of secret documents from the archives of the former regime's repressive organisations. Various motives were behind the seizure of these archives. Some the parties sought to exploit the seized documents for political and propaganda reasons, such as scandalising their opponents or even murdering suspected collaborators. Many Iraqis sought to know the fate of their missing relatives, while others wanted to make money by selling copies of the original documents and records.

It is important to emphasize that the Allied Forces, the United States and Great Britain, also seized large quantities of documents and records from the former regime's archives. It is very likely that these documents and records are abroad. The private archival project, Iraq Foundation Memory (IFM), also controls millions of official documents and records of the former regime. The IFM has been constructing its collections illegally, contrary to Iraqi archival laws and well-known standards and practices. The bulk of the IFM's collections are made of those documents and records that were seized by the Kurdish resistance movement during the popular uprising of 1991. For security reasons, Kurdish leaders had decided to send the seized documents and records abroad. They were deposited at the University of Colorado, before being seized by the IFM following the collapse of the former regime.

The INLA has tried in vain to persuade the first and the second Iraqi governments (July 2003-December 2005) to take step, which could force all the parties concerned to hand over the seized documents and records to the National Archive. The central government has been reluctant to take any positive step in that direction, as many of its members were involved in the looting of the former regime's archives. It seems that all parties in the government and in the opposition agree with each other that they must keep the seized documents and records under their control.

e) The Construction of a Restoration Laboratory

It is important to mention that, since the beginning of the war, the INLA has not been able to place its archival and book collections in appropriate repositories. The long duration of the blackouts and considerable financial constrains have made it impossible for the INLA to provide the right temperature and humidity for its collections. This can partly explain why the INLA could not take effective steps to rescue its damaged documents and records and thus minimise its cultural losses.

The application of preservation and conservation guidelines is a priority for the INLA, as its archivists and librarians lack both practical experience and theoretical knowledge. In view of the considerable damage inflicted on the INLA's archival collections, the construction of a restoration laboratory has become an urgent necessity. The INLA is truly grateful to the Czech Ministry of Culture for funding a two-month restoration-training project for four of its archivists. The project was implemented through a private Czech company, Gemma. It is now certain that the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs will fund another project to povide the INLA with some necessary equipment for its restoration laboratory. The local government of Tuscany has funded, through the Italian NGO, Un Ponte Per, a two-month advanced restoration training programme at the National Library in Florence.

f) The Reconstruction of the Micrographic Laboratory

The INLA's Micrographic Laboratory was completely destroyed during the painful events of mid-April 2003. The INLA has identified the reconstruction of the laboratory as another priority for its future disaster recovery plan. The Czech Ministry of Culture has again come to the INLA's rescue by funding another project to purchase equipment for a micrographic laboratory, including one 35mm camera, four readers, one reader-printer and one film processor. The American Genealogical Society has also promised the INLA to send four more cameras (two 35mm and two 16mm). The technicians will resume the filming of the INLA's archival collections, rare books and periodicals as soon as the cameras and the air-conditioning system are installed. The principal idea is to make several copies of the original collections and then deposit them in different secure places.

g) The Construction of a Five-Store Repository & the Renovation of the Main Building

The renovation process of the INLA's main building began late last year, and will be completed at the end of this year. A new air-conditioning and ventilation system will be installed. As the INLA has been suffering from an acute storage problem for many years, the Iraqi Ministry of Culture has decided to allocate a fund for the construction of a new five-store repository for the National Archives' collections in the years 2006-2007. The new repository will be fully furnished and equipped.

g) The Construction of an Electronic Database:

The construction of an electronic database lies at the heart of the modernization process of the INLA. With the financial assistance of the local government of Lombardi in Italy, the INLA have been setting up an electronic database for its library and archival collections for the first time in its history. The implementation of this project has been speeded up, after the INLA received some funding from the Japanese government. The back-ups of the database and the reproduction of the collections are becoming an integrated part of the INLA's recovery plan.

Concluding Remarks

One of the important lessons one can draw from the INLA's unpreparedness for the disaster that hit it on 10-12 April 2003 is that it is extremely difficult to put together a well-prepared disaster recovery plan under totalitarian regimes. Dictators give the political survival and the security of their regime priority over all other issues. The disaster that hit the INLA is a man-made one, and must be considered as one of the last outrages committed by the leaders of the former regime against Iraq's cultural heritage.

At present, the INLA has been encountering many dangers and problems, including terrorism, sabotage, environmental threats, and shortage of electricity supplies. All these negatively affect the work and lives of the archivists and librarians. It is not exaggeration to say that the INLA is a very vulnerable institution, being located in a high-risk inner city. One of the National Guards' main bases, which are obvious military targets for the terrorists, is just opposite the INLA's main building. If one carries out a risk assessment, one will find that the most probable threat that the INLA is facing is terrorist attacks and politically motivated sabotage. The efforts of the INLA are also conditioned by its limited financial capability. It cannot do more than adopt some security measures to protect its staff and its collections, such as hiring additional guards and installing surveillance cameras. But, terrorist attacks (e.g. car-bomb explosions and mortar shelling) are very difficult to counter by any disaster preparedness or planning.

The INLA hopes that the coming year (2006) will witness considerable progress in several fields, notably the storage and the reconstruction of its collections, the restoration of its water-damaged documents and records, the re-qualification of its archivists, librarians and technicians, the acquiring of new equipment and the application of modern systems and practices.

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